

# *Institutions and Representational Roles in American State Legislatures*

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Christopher A. Cooper, *Western Carolina University*  
Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., *University of Missouri*

## ABSTRACT

What is the impact of a legislature's institutions on the representational roles its members adopt? We address this question by examining the role orientation of state legislators in eight states, explaining why some legislators identify more with a trustee model of representation and others identify more with the delegate model. Using ordinal logistic regression analysis on data from a survey of 447 legislators, we test for the effects of multimember districts and term limits, along with several other factors. First, we find that representational roles and behavior are related; legislators who think of themselves as delegates are much more likely to hold frequent district office hours than their counterparts who think of themselves as trustees. Second, we find that, overall, legislators are more likely to consider themselves trustees than delegates. Third, we find that multimember districts and term limits increase the likelihood that legislators think of themselves as trustees. Thus, legislative institutions can influence the representational roles legislators adopt.

A BASIC TENET OF POLITICAL SCIENCE is that institutions can affect behavior (Shepsle and Weingast 1995). For example, when rules of a legislative body change, we expect that the policies produced by that chamber will change as a result (Larimer 2005). Likewise, as the rules of elections change, so do the outcomes of those elections (Cox 1990). Although institutions are generally believed to affect representation (Moncrief, Thompson, and Cassie 1996), most research on this relationship has focused on one case—the United States Congress—whose institutions have largely remained constant.<sup>1</sup> In keeping with Jewell's (1983, 310) call to uncover the "variables that may help to explain particular role orientations," we use the institutional variation in the American state legislatures to test whether legislative institutions can influence legislators' representational roles. We also demonstrate the influence of a legislator's role orientation on his or her legislative behavior and describe

the distribution of representational roles among American state legislators. In doing so, we gain a better sense of how representation is practiced and how institutions shape outcomes in American state legislatures.

## REPRESENTATIONAL ROLES

Scholars and practitioners of American politics have long debated the proper form of legislative representation. During deliberations over the ratification of the United States Constitution, anti-Federalists and Federalists sparred over whether legislators should make decisions they believe are in the “best interest of the state” or decisions that “follow the will of the governed” (Carman 2003, 2). More recently, scholars have placed these trade-offs on a scale characterizing role orientations from “delegate” to “trustee” (Pitkin 1967), with “politicos” residing somewhere in the middle (Wahlke et al. 1962). Delegates believe they are in office to follow the unfiltered opinion of the people. A pure delegate does not express his or her personal opinion on an issue, but rather votes based on the opinion of the constituents. On the other hand, a pure trustee believes that he or she is in office to act by making the best decision possible on some objective criteria, regardless of the constituents’ opinions. When district opinion and legislator opinion about the best course of policy action come into conflict, a trustee believes that the opinion of the people is less important than his or her own opinion. Many trace the evolution of the trustee model to Edmund Burke, who argued it was advisable for representatives to “promote the interests of constituents without consulting their wishes” (Rosenthal 1998, 8).

Which of these representational roles is most commonly adopted by American legislators? Most scholars have found that state and national legislators in this country are more likely to characterize themselves as trustees than delegates (Cavanagh 1982; Gross 1978; Hanson 1989; Rosenthal 1998; Wahlke et al. 1962). Of course, while it is instructive to think in terms of the ideal types of delegate or trustee, most legislators fall somewhere in the middle. Many legislators even display different roles on different issues. Nonetheless, legislators’ general tendencies can teach us a great deal about how they view representation and the proper relationship between citizens and their elected officials.

While scholars have debated the usefulness of these concepts for years (Cavanagh 1982; Gross 1978), most have found that representational roles vary in systematic and predictable ways (Carman 2003) and that they have important implications for understanding representation. These role orientations are particularly useful in explaining legislative behavior on salient

issues where constituents may have well-established opinions (Kuklinski and Elling 1977; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979). For instance, a legislator's rhetoric about representational roles may affect how he or she is viewed by the public (Lipinski 2003).

Even in political systems with strong party discipline, representational roles vary and can affect behavior (Searing 1991, 1994). Studlar and McAllister (1996) showed that these roles affect both constituency service and vote margins in Australian legislatures, and Searing (1991) suggests these roles do a better job of explaining time spent in the district for British Members of Parliament than tenure, electoral marginality, party, or distance from home. Clearly, these roles affect not only a legislator's own ideas about representation, but they also affect his or her legislative behavior.

### EXPLAINING REPRESENTATIONAL ROLES

Many factors may influence the representational role a legislator adopts. Because the impact of institutional characteristics is the primary focus of this article, we address them first, concentrating on two major variables: multimember districts (MMDs) and term limits.

Single-member districts (SMDs), in which only one legislator is elected to represent a district, are by far the most common electoral structure in the United States today, but several American state legislatures and many legislatures worldwide use at least some multimember districts (MMDs), in which more than one legislator is chosen on the same ballot to serve a single district. Because most research on legislative representation has focused on SMD systems, the impact of this aspect of district structure on representation has rarely been examined (Bowler and Farrell 1993). Extant research is dated and anecdotal, but it generally suggests legislators who serve in MMDs are less known to their constituents and, therefore, are considered less accountable. For example, Jewell (1982, 119) found that "legislators were more likely to be trustees in states using multimember districts, somewhat more likely to be trustees where there had been a recent shift from multimember to single-member districts, and slightly more likely to be delegates where single-member districts had long been used." Legislators in SMDs are better known to their constituents, and they must listen to the entire district, rather than just a small subconstituency, if they wish to be re-elected. As a result, SMD legislators are "more vulnerable to pressure from groups that are concentrated in the district" (Jewell 1982, 119), and they must hew closer to the demands of their constituents. In other words, "single-member districts . . . tend to bring members and constituents closer together" (Rosenthal 1998, 29).

These differences in district structure may produce legislators with different role orientations because they create different incentives for candidates, with MMDs shifting the incentive away from the focus on the median voter that SMDs encourage (Cox 1990). For example, in a race involving four candidates running for two seats on the same ballot, one who receives less than 26 percent of the vote from any part of the constituency may win a seat. Furthermore, such a race may pit two fellow party members against one another as well as against members of the opposite party. In general, an MMD candidate does not have to seek the center of the district's ideological distribution to win (Adams 1996; Cox 1990; Richardson, Russell, and Cooper 2004). Therefore, legislators who wish to seek re-election need only concentrate on their subconstituency of active supporters and can ignore the median voter. This situation leads us to our first major hypothesis:

H<sub>1</sub>: Legislators who serve in multimember districts are more likely to claim to be trustees.

The most recent wave of institutional reform in state legislatures has been the inclusion of term limits. In an effort to reduce careerism in state legislatures, in the 1990s, 21 states passed laws limiting the number of terms lawmakers can serve. While six states have since removed these limits, 29 chambers in 15 states still limit legislative service to between six and 12 years. By July 2005, 1,218 legislators had been termed out, but five chambers had not yet reached the date when their limits would start to take effect (National Conference of State Legislators 2005).

Both reformers and scholars expected term limits to alter the relationship between legislators and their constituents. Our argument emphasizes the idea that ambitious legislators are driven by the re-election motive (Mayhew 1974), and the removal of long-term electoral pressures reduces their incentive to focus on constituent preferences (Glazer and Wattenburg 1996). Because term-limited legislators are not as motivated by re-election, they may spend more time engaged in lawmaking and less time on constituency casework, pork barrel projects, and other activities related to their districts (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). Will (1992) argues that term limits will lead to the election of citizen legislators who will be more likely to follow their own consciences rather than hew strictly to constituency preferences. Therefore, a term-limited legislator may be more likely to act as a trustee.

Other scholars have argued against such a "Burkean shift" (Corey et al. 2003) toward a trustee role. For example, Petracca (1991) argues that legislative professionalism distances lawmakers from their constituents and that term limits would be more likely to produce legislators who are closer to

their constituents. Taking a different approach, Wright (2004, 19) uses *NOMINATE* legislative voting scores for all state legislative chambers in 1999–2000, finding “absolutely no evidence that constituency preferences matter less in chambers where term limits have been implemented.”

To test the effect of term limits, one could use a dummy variable to indicate a legislator in a state with term limits. But during our study period, many term-limit states have legislatures that are composed of members who were elected before and after term limits became law. The single dummy variable approach assumes that all legislators in such a body would change their behavior and attitudes in response to the removal of the electoral incentive when term limits are passed. This assumption may be unwarranted. In the four term-limit states in our study, many veteran legislators may not have considered term limits when they were first elected, but all first-term legislators were recruited after term limits had removed some legislators in the state. Therefore, we hypothesize two different effects of term limits on representational roles. We assess separately whether term limits affect all sitting legislators or whether the main effect is through the recruitment of legislators with different attitudes than those who are attracted to legislatures without term limits.

H<sub>2A</sub>: All legislators subject to term limits are more likely to claim to be trustees.

H<sub>2B</sub>: Legislators elected for the first time under term limits are more likely to claim to be trustees.

In addition to the impacts of these legislative institutions, a number of other factors may influence which representational roles legislators adopt. To make unbiased tests of our hypotheses of institutional effects, we must control for these forces in our models.

First, consider that legislators are elected from very different types of constituencies even within the same state. We expect that legislators who represent heterogeneous districts are more likely to consider themselves as trustees since they cannot easily identify a single district opinion (Fiorina 1974). Districts can be heterogeneous on a variety of dimensions, but an important one in American politics is ethnic diversity. To create ethnic diversity in state legislative districts, we collected data directly from each state’s Secretary of State. When such data were not available from a Secretary of State, we used geographic information systems software to determine the percentage of each census block group in a state in our sample (2000 summary tape 3 or SF3) that fell within each state legislative district and divided the demographic data accordingly (United States Bureau of the Census 2005). We

then totaled the demographic data for each legislative district based on the block group fragments contained within the district, resulting in an estimate of the demographic profile of each legislative district. We then used Hero and Tolbert's (1996) formula to calculate a racial heterogeneity score for each district.<sup>2</sup> Theoretically, this variable could vary from 0 to 1.0, with a district composed entirely of one ethnic category receiving the low score and one with several equally represented ethnic groups receiving the high score. In our dataset, our lowest scoring legislative district (.007) was in South Dakota with 99.7 percent non-Hispanic whites, and the highest scoring district (.714) was in New Jersey with 22.0 percent Latinos, 37.0 percent non-Hispanic whites, 29.0 percent blacks, and 12.0 percent Asian Americans.

Another characteristic of a legislative district that could affect a legislator's representational role is distance from the state capital. A legislator who lives far from the capital may find it more difficult to travel to the district and spend time with his or her constituents, suggesting that he or she would adopt more of a trustee role because of the difficulty of determining the district's wishes.

A legislator's personal characteristics may also be important in shaping his or her representational style. Because African-American legislators often represent more homogeneous majority-minority districts, black state legislators may act more like delegates than their white colleagues (Swain 1993; Whitby 1997; Burnside and Haysley-Jordan 2003). On the other hand, there is little evidence supporting this effect in other minority legislators. While the states included in our study were served by black, Latino and Latina, Native-American, and Asian-American legislators, in addition to white legislators, there were too few survey respondents in some ethnic categories to create separate variables for each. Therefore, we include a single ethnic minority variable in our models to control for any effect, based on the legislator's self-identified minority status.

Freshman legislators may enter the legislature with different ideas about representation than will develop later in their careers. Specifically, because of electoral uncertainty and traditional homestyle patterns, we would expect that first-time legislators are more likely to consider themselves as delegates. Lipinski (2003) finds evidence supporting this hypothesis in the congressional context, but no work explicitly examines this relationship in the state legislature.

There is also reason to believe that the manner in which female legislators view the job differs from that of their male colleagues. Differences in sex-role socialization may lead women to spend more time in their districts and conduct more constituency service than men (Carey, Niemi, and Powell

1998; Richardson and Freeman 1995). As a result, we expect that female legislators are more likely to perceive themselves as delegates than their male counterparts.

Finally, the strength of a legislator's ideology may affect his or her role orientation. Legislators who consider themselves to be extreme liberals or extreme conservatives are likely to hold strong worldviews on a range of policies and, therefore, may feel less compelled to follow the guidance of others in their legislative activities, including their constituents (Richardson, Russell, and Cooper 2004). As a result, these ideological extremists are more likely to view themselves as trustees than their more moderate colleagues.

Thus, theory and previous research suggests a number of potential predictors of representational roles. Specifically, we expect that, all else being equal, multimember districts and term limits encourage legislators to perceive themselves as trustees, and ideological extremists will also be more inclined to self-identify as trustees. On the other hand, we expect that legislators who are members of ethnic minorities, in their first term, female, or represent homogenous districts are more likely to view themselves as delegates.

## DATA AND METHODS

To test these hypotheses, we gathered data using an original mail survey of state legislators in eight states: Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and South Dakota. This survey was sent to 1,176 legislators in June 2003. After three weeks, we sent a second wave to non-respondents. A third wave was sent to non-respondents in states with particularly low response rates. The survey procedures conformed to Dillman's Tailored Design Method (2000).<sup>3</sup>

Overall, the survey had a 42 percent response rate, with each state having a response rate of at least 32 percent (AZ=53 percent, CO=48 percent, MO=48 percent, NJ=32 percent, ND=47 percent, PA=34 percent, SC=35 percent, SD=52 percent). To account for different response rates in the states, we "weighted the sample by a factor proportional to the inverse of the overall probability of selection and of response," following Carey, Niemi, and Powell's (2000, 688) approach in their 50-state survey of state legislators. Our response rate compares favorably with that of other recent surveys of state legislators (e.g., Maestas 2003) and other state-level political elites (e.g., Abbe and Herrnson 2004). Non-response does not seem to have biased our sample in any obvious way because the demographic characteristics of our sample are similar to the population of legislators in these eight states in 2003. For example, the survey sample includes 19 percent female legislators (compared to 18 percent in the population of these eight state legislatures),

36 percent first-time legislators (compared to 31 percent in the population), and 54 percent Republicans (compared to 54 percent in the population).

We chose these states for the survey sample for several reasons. First, half of these states (AZ, NJ, SD, ND) have MMDs in their lower chambers and SMDs in their upper chambers. The district lines in these states are identical for both chambers, providing an ideal place to investigate the effects of district structure on representation. These are the only four states in the country with such a structure. There are a number of types of MMDs<sup>4</sup> (Cox 1990), but we focus on the classic bloc MMD system in these four states. In this form, an MMD occurs when two or more legislators are elected from the same geographic area at the same time. In these four states, the ballot may include a number of candidates (from two to seven in the 2002 election), and voters are instructed to vote for no more than two. The other four states (CO, MO, PA, SC) in our sample have only SMDs in their legislatures.

Second, half of these states (AZ, CO, MO, SD) have implemented term limits, and the other half have not. Each of these states has an eight-year limit, but only Missouri precludes termed-out legislators from running again after sitting out an election. The National Conference of State Legislators (2005) estimates that 235 legislators had been termed out in these four states by 2003, when the survey was administered. Third, the sampled states display wide variation on state legislative professionalism. For example, North Dakota and South Dakota have citizen legislatures, while the Pennsylvania and New Jersey legislatures are among the most professional in the nation. The remainder are hybrid states, residing somewhere between the two extremes (Kousser 2005). Finally, the states also vary considerably in terms of political culture (Elazar 1966) and policy liberalism (Gray et al. 2004). Overall, these eight states provide us with a representative cross-section of American state legislatures. Detailed information about these states is presented in Table 1.

Although these states vary along five dimensions (MMDs, term limits, legislative professionalism, political culture, and liberalism), we did not test the impact of each of them on legislative representational roles. Our primary interest remains in the effects of institutions on these roles, so we include MMDs and term limits as independent variables in our model explaining variation in role orientations, but we do not include political culture or liberalism. Including these variables would introduce too many state-level variables in the model, providing unique identifiers that are virtually perfectly collinear. Culture is most problematic because it is closely related to professionalism in our sample, with both of our citizen legislatures being in moralistic states and both our professional legislatures being in individualistic states. Furthermore, Hero and Tolbert (1996) demonstrate that ethnic diversity (which we include in the model) is highly correlated with culture nationwide.



Table 1. Characteristics of the Sample States

	Professionalism <sup>1</sup>	MMDs <sup>2</sup>	Term Limits <sup>3</sup>	Dominant Political Culture <sup>4</sup>	Policy Liberalism <sup>5</sup>
Arizona	.279	Yes	Yes/2000	Traditional	32
Colorado	.273	No	Yes/1998	Moralistic	19
Missouri	.295	No	Yes/2002	Individualistic	21
New Jersey	.369	Yes	No	Individualistic	14
North Dakota	.102	Yes	No	Moralistic	46
Pennsylvania	.403	No	No	Individualistic	25
South Carolina	.208	No	No	Traditional	20
South Dakota	.108	Yes	Yes/2000	Moralistic	48

1. Source: King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000

2. MMD states have MMDs in the lower chamber, but no MMDs in the upper chamber.

3. Source: NCSL 2004. "Yes" denotes that a state has legislative term limits, with the year of full implementation shown for those states.

4. Source: Elazar 1966

5. Source: Gray et al. 2004. Lower numbers indicate a more liberal state.

Legislative professionalism (Mooney 1994) is also difficult to include in our model because it also correlates very highly with MMD status, with the majority of our MMD respondents being from states with low professionalism scores. Despite this practical difficulty, this variable speaks closely to our original research question. Professionalism is an institutional arrangement that could affect a legislator's role orientation by affecting his or her insulation from the constituents and the freedom with which he or she can act as a trustee (Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000). On the other hand, the staff and other resources available in professional legislatures may help legislators maintain awareness of district opinion, which would facilitate a delegate style of representation (Maestas 2003). To account for the effect of legislative professionalism, but to avoid the extreme collinearity problem identified above, we use professionalism as the cluster variable in the robust standard error estimates in our models rather than as an independent variable (Wooldridge 2003; Franzese 2005). This specification accounts for the impact of professionalism on the dependent variable by adjusting the standard errors for intragroup correlation within the three broad professionalism categories of citizen, hybrid, and professional legislatures (Kousser 2005, 14–6).

## RESULTS


In this section, we describe the distribution of legislators in our sample on a scale of representational roles. Next, we test whether self-professed representational role orientations affect legislative behavior. After all, if these

roles do not influence behavior, there is little reason to describe or explain their variation. Once we establish such a behavioral link, we present a series of multivariate models that explain variation among these roles.

*The Distribution of Representational Roles*

First, consider the distribution of legislators on a seven-point representational role scale, ranging from delegate (1) to trustee (7).<sup>5</sup> Figure 1 demonstrates two important points for our analysis. First, considerable variation occurs between these self-reported roles. Some legislators consider themselves pure trustees, a few consider themselves pure delegates, and the majority consider themselves to be something in-between. Second, the scale leans heavily toward trustee orientation. Clearly, legislators tend to weigh their own opinions about the best public policy when making decisions. This evident tendency is consistent with previous studies (Cavanagh 1982; Gross 1978; Hanson 1989; Rosenthal 1998) and may reflect either a normative bias toward claiming to be decisive and principled or simply the lack of knowledge that most citizens have about what the state legislature often does.

Figure 1. Representational Roles in State Legislatures



Source: Author's survey of 434 state legislators in eight states  
 N=434

Note: This figure shows the percentage of our respondents who placed themselves on each point in our seven-point representational role scale.

*The Behavioral Implications of Representational Roles*

To assess the behavioral implications of representational role orientation, we estimated an ordinal logistic regression model where the dependent variable is a scale representing the frequency with which a legislator holds office hours in his or her district (ranging from never to daily). The frequency of office hours is an important behavioral indicator of how much importance a legislator places on casework and, presumably, how seriously he or she takes the opinions of his or her constituents (Freeman and Richardson 1994). Our key independent variable in this model is where the legislator falls on the delegate-trustee scale. We also include a number of control variables to account for alternative explanations in the frequency of office hours: district homogeneity (Fenno 1978), whether the legislator is a member of a racial or ethnic minority (Haynie 2001), a female (Richardson and Freeman 1995), an ideological extremist (Richardson, Russell, and Cooper 2004), or a freshman (Hibbing 1991), and the distance from the district to the capital (Hart and Munger 1989). We expect that delegates are more likely to hold frequent office hours than their colleagues who fall toward the trustee end of the scale.

*Table 2.* Influences on the Frequency of Office Hours

	Estimated Coefficient (Std. Error)
Representational role	-0.172 *** (0.066)
Ethnic diversity	0.576 (1.492)
Minority legislator	0.447 (0.360)
District distance from capital (in 100s of miles)	-0.079 (0.205)
Female legislator	-0.640*** (0.119)
Ideological extremist	-0.197*** (0.073)
Freshman legislator	-0.393 (0.329)
N	422
Log pseudo-likelihood	-547.22

\*  $p < .10$ ; \*\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .01$ ; all tests are two-tailed tests

*Note:* These are ordinal logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on legislative professionalism. We do not report the intercepts for the different levels of the ordinal dependent variable.

The estimated model in Table 2 clearly supports our hypothesis. The more a legislator identifies with the trustee role, the less frequently he or she reported holding district office hours, indicating that trustees are less connected to their districts. To determine the strength of this statistically significant relationship, we estimated the predicted probabilities for the extremes on the role-orientation scale (Table 3). Holding all other variables at their sample means or modes, we estimate that a pure trustee has a 43 percent chance of holding daily or weekly office hours, while a pure delegate has a 67 percent chance. Alternatively, we estimate trustees to have a 52 percent chance of never or infrequently holding office hours, whereas a delegate has a 28 percent probability of such infrequent constituent contact. While most legislators are not located on either extreme of this scale, these results indicate that role orientation and behavior are strongly related. Delegates act differently toward their constituents than trustees.

### *Explaining Variation in Representational Roles*

Next, we attempt to explain the variation in representational roles among legislators, focusing primarily on the hypotheses of institutional effects related to MMDs and term limits. Our dependent variable represents responses to our survey question about legislative role orientation, ranging from 1 (pure delegate) to 7 (pure trustee). This dependent variable is negatively skewed (Figure 1), which is problematic for ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Furthermore, while legislators filling out the survey could rank the categories in the scale, we cannot assume equal distances between the categories, again raising concerns for OLS analysis of these data (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975; Long and Freese 2001). Consequently, we use ordinal logistic regression, which is appropriate for this sort of dependent variable, along with robust standard errors with clustering on the legislative professionalism categories of citizen, hybrid, and professional (Kousser 2005) to account for clustering in the data (Wooldridge 2003; Franzese 2005).

Our primary hypotheses are that legislators representing MMDs and

*Table 3.* Predicted Probabilities of the Frequency of District Office Hours for Different Representational Roles

	Probability of holding office hours never or infrequently	Probability of holding office hours daily or weekly
Delegate	.282	.674
Trustee	.524	.425

*Note:* These are the predicted probabilities for each type of role orientation from the estimated model in Table 2, holding all other variables at their sample means or modes (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

legislators in a term-limit state (especially first-time legislators in term-limit states, operationalized with an interaction between freshman status and being in a term-limit state) will be more likely to self-identify as a trustee (choosing one of the higher scores on our seven-point scale). We expect legislators representing more homogenous districts, those who live farther from the state capital, ideological moderates, freshmen, and female and ethnic minority legislators to be delegates. In Table 4, we present our ordinal logistic regression estimates to test these hypotheses. Overall, our results suggest that there is a strong systematic component to a legislator's choice of representational role. The effects of the variables for MMD, freshman in a term-limit state, distance from the capital, freshman, and female and minority legislator are all statistically significant.

Consider first our primary hypotheses of institutional effects. The MMD variable's estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that legislators who are elected from MMDs are more likely to self-identify as trustees than legislators who are elected from SMDs, who are more likely

*Table 4.* Influences on Legislators' Representational Roles

	Estimated Coefficient (Std. Error)
Multimember district (MMD)	0.206*** (0.043)
Term limits	0.136 (0.248)
Term limits $\times$ Freshman legislator	0.850*** (0.049)
Ethnic diversity	-0.106 (0.826)
Miles from capital (in 100s)	-0.161* (0.091)
Ideological extremist	0.286 (0.219)
Freshman legislator	-1.007*** (0.120)
Female legislator	-0.076*** (0.027)
Minority legislator	-0.358** (0.151)
N	433
Log pseudo-likelihood	-650.70

\*  $p < .10$ ; \*\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .01$ ; all tests are two-tailed tests

*Note:* These are ordinal logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on legislative professionalism. We do not report the intercepts for the different levels of the ordinal dependent variable.

to consider themselves to be delegates. Given that MMDs seem to promote trusteeship in legislative representation, some of the decline in representative democracy in state legislatures that Rosenthal (1998) has observed may be due to the reduction of MMDs over the past few decades.

Beyond simply confirming our hypothesis, this finding indicates that more research needs to be done regarding the effects of district structure on styles of legislative representation. Much has been written on the influence of MMDs over descriptive representation (Arceneaux 2001; Hogan 2001; King 2002; Moncrief and Thompson 1992) and legislator ideology (Adams 1996; Cox 1990; Richardson, Russell, and Cooper 2004), but few studies have considered how district structure influences interactions with constituents and the influence of those interactions on legislator decisionmaking. Given that millions of Americans reside in multimember state legislative districts, this is clearly an important subject that deserves more study.

The term limits variable main effect is not statistically significant, a finding that fails to support Hypothesis 2A. But term limits do not appear to affect all legislators the same way. The interaction effect between the freshman and term-limit variables is statistically significant, indicating that legislators who are elected knowing that they will serve under term limits are more likely to consider themselves trustees. This finding supports Hypothesis 2B. Note that the estimated coefficient for the freshman variable main effect is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that freshmen in non-term-limited legislatures enter the office with different ideas about representation than legislators in term-limited legislatures. A freshman legislator in a non-term-limited state is more inclined toward being a delegate, but this effect is virtually negated in term-limit states. Although term limits were created to bring legislators closer to their constituents, the positive coefficient on the freshman-term limits interaction variable shows that term limits actually negate the pull toward being a delegate that freshmen tend to feel. Because these freshmen legislators no longer can consider a long-term career in their chamber, they are freer to pursue their own policy goals rather than the goals of the district. This finding should give pause to term limits reformers who see the reform as enhancing representation, and it speaks to recent scholarly debates over the representational effects of term limits (Carey et al. 2003; Wright 2004).

The model in Table 4 also has several control variables with statistically significant effects. Those legislators who live farther from the state capital are less likely to be trustees. Perhaps legislators who live farther from the capital make more of an effort to connect with their constituents because they spend less time at home. Since they are less able to provide the symbolic

representation of spending time in their district, they may react by acting more as delegates for their constituents.

These results also suggest that female legislators are more likely to consider themselves delegates. This finding is consistent with previous studies suggesting that female legislators pay more attention to district concerns (Richardson and Freeman 1995; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998), but it contradicts those studies that suggest female legislators are less inclined than male legislators to see themselves as delegates (Reingold 2000).

Likewise, legislators who are members of racial or ethnic minorities are significantly more likely to consider themselves delegates. This result is consistent with Swain (1993), Whitby (1997), and Burnside and Haysley-Jordan (2003) but stands in stark contrast to the Lipinski (2003) study that finds minority legislators tend to be trustees. Because previous research focused mainly on African-American legislators, we also ran this model with a dichotomous variable for only black lawmakers. The estimated coefficient was quite similar ( $-.302$ ) and statistically significant. Furthermore, because of the possibility of collinearity with the district diversity measure, we tested the model without the district measure and found much the same results for the black legislator and minority legislator variables. Finally, we tested for an interaction between the district diversity measure and minority variable, and the result was not statistically significant. These results suggest that our findings are quite robust to alternate specifications. Clearly, the role orientation of minority legislators deserves further exploration.

## CONCLUSION

The study of political representation has a long and productive history in political science. Recently, scholars of Congress (Lipinski 2003), public opinion (Carman 2003), state legislatures (Rosenthal 1998; Smith 2003), and comparative politics (Searing 1991, 1994; Studlar and McAllister 1996; Taylor 1992) have used the concept of representational roles to gain a better understanding of how legislators and their constituents relate to one another. Our study of representational roles in the state legislature addressed three questions: 1) are self-reported representational roles related to behavior, 2) where do legislators place themselves on a scale of representational roles, and 3) how do institutions affect the type of representational roles legislators assume? In particular, we were interested in the effects of multimember districts (MMDs) and term limits on these roles.

Our study has produced three notable findings. First, self-identified representational roles and legislative behavior are related. Legislators who

claim to be closer to the delegate end of the scale are much more likely to hold frequent office hours than legislators who consider themselves trustees. This outcome supports recent comparative research that demonstrates the importance of representational roles for understanding legislative behavior (Searing 1991; Studlar and McAllister 1996).

Second, we find that legislators tend to prefer a trustee model of representation, as advocated by Edmund Burke more than 200 years ago (Burke 1967). Of course, this outcome may not be terribly surprising. Since Wahlke et al.'s (1962) early study of state legislatures, most scholars have found that legislators claim to prefer this style of representation. Thus, despite the "decline in representative democracy" (Rosenthal 1998) and myriad changes in American politics, state legislative role orientations do not appear to have changed much over the past 40 years.

Third, and most important, we find that the adoption of representational roles has a systematic component, and that it is in large part driven by institutional arrangements. First-time legislators who were elected after the implementation of term limits and those who represent MMDs are significantly more likely to consider themselves trustees. We also found that representational roles are influenced systematically by certain demographic factors, with legislators representing districts farther from the state capital, freshman legislators in non-term-limited states, female legislators, and legislators who are members of racial and ethnic minorities being more likely to consider themselves delegates.

The effects of institutional structure on representational roles should be of special interest to both political scientists and reformers because these structures reflect public policy choices, and as such, they can be changed through the political process. Scholars have learned much about the influence of district structure on descriptive representation in legislatures, but few have examined how this can affect the relationship between legislators and their constituents. Jewell (1982) believed that single-member district systems produced legislators who were more responsive to their districts, both in terms of their role orientations and their attitudes toward casework. Our study surveying more than 400 state legislators supports Jewell's hypothesis. In addition, legislators in two of our MMD states, North Dakota and South Dakota, represent small, homogeneous districts, which previous work has shown tend to produce legislators who describe themselves as delegates (Fenno 1978; Rosenthal 1981; Squire 1993). We believe this inclusion gives our findings further credibility. If MMDs generate trustees even in these sorts of districts, this institutional influence must be strong, indeed.

We find term limits to be another institutional feature that produces sys-



Table A1. Source and Coding of Variables

Variable Name	Question Wording or Source	Range	Mean/Mode
Representational role	"As you think about your job as state legislator, where would you place yourself on a scale of delegate to trustee, where delegate represents a legislator who votes strictly on the preferences of the voters and trustee represents a legislator who uses his or her own best judgment to decide issues?"	1-7	5.04
Legislative professionalism	From King 2000	.102-.403	.256
Multimember district (MMD)	Coded by authors	0-1	0
Term limits	Coded by authors	0-1	0
Ethnic diversity	Calculated from 2000 Census data, as per Hero and Tolbert 1996	.007-.714	.253
Ideological extremist	"How would you describe your political views on a scale of 1-7, where 1 = extremely liberal and 7 = extremely conservative?" This was recoded as the absolute value of this score minus 4 so that moderates equal 0 and extremists equal 3.	0-3	1.31
Female legislator	Coded by authors from online biographies of legislators.	0-1	0
Freshman legislator	Coded by authors from online biographies of legislators.	0-1	0
Term limits × Freshman	Interaction term	0-1	0
Minority legislator	"How would you classify your ethnicity? Caucasian, Latino/Latina, African American, Native American, Asian American, Other." This was recoded as Minority (non-Caucasian) = 1; Caucasian = 0	0-1	0
Office hours	"How often do you personally hold office hours for the public in your district? 5 = daily; 4 = weekly; 3 = every two weeks; 2 = monthly; 1 = infrequently; 0 = never."	0-5	2.70
Miles from capital	Calculated by entering the legislator's hometown into <i>Mapquest</i> and mapping the distance to the state capital.	0-420	124.6

Note: Variables defined by question wording are from the authors' June 2003 survey of state legislators in eight states.

tematic effects on representation. While term limits were enacted for a variety of reasons (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Kousser 2005), their advocates argued that these limits would take careerism out of state politics and bring legislators closer to the people. Our evidence suggests that term limits may have had a different effect. Because term-limited legislators face considerably reduced electoral incentives, they may be more likely to eschew a delegate style of representation and make decisions based on their personal views. In other words, term limits may produce legislators who fall closer to the Burkean ideal of trustee. While more time is needed for the effects of term limits to be assessed fully, our finding that freshmen legislators elected under term limits tend toward being trustees gives support for this hypothesis.

#### ENDNOTES

1. For a good review of what we know and do not know about representation in the state legislature, see Moncrief, Thompson, and Cassie 1996.

2. Hero and Tolbert's (1996) formula is:  $\text{diversity} = 1 - ((\% \text{ Latino})^2 + (\% \text{ black})^2 + (\% \text{ white})^2 + (\% \text{ Asian})^2 + (\% \text{ American Indian})^2 + (\% \text{ other})^2)$ . The actual groups used for this calculation varied by state depending on data availability, and the numbers for all groups other than Latino were for non-Hispanics.

3. A complete description of the survey instrument is available at <http://paws.wcu.edu/ccoooper>.

4. For instance, in some states (such as New Hampshire), there are more than two seats in some districts. Other varieties include seat and staggered MMDs. Seat MMDs occur when there are two openings on a ballot in a single-district, but candidates must specify for which of the seats they are running. Voters then choose among different slates of candidates for seat A and seat B. Washington and Idaho use seat MMDs. Staggered MMDs occur when two or more legislators represent the same geographic area in the same chamber but are elected in different years. The United States Senate has staggered MMDs (Schiller 1996). Various districting arrangements are sometimes referred to as MMDs, but they can have very different electoral effects (Hamm and Moncrief 1999). As a result, in this study, we consider only the classic bloc form of MMD rather than any of its variants.

5. The text of all of the questions in our survey can be found in the Appendix.

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