

logic very much. It contains, however, nothing but subtler distinctions which, as all correct subtleties do, sharpen the understanding but are of no essential use.

Among the more recent philosophers there are two who have set general logic going, Leibniz and Wolff.

Malebranche and Locke have not actually written a logic, as they deal also with the content of cognition and the origin of concepts.

Wolff's general logic is the best we have. Some have connected it with Aristotle's, as, for instance, Reusch.²⁰

Baumgarten,²¹ a man who has much merit, condensed the Wolffian logic, and Meier in turn commented on Baumgarten.

To the more recent logicians also belongs Crusius²² who did not consider, however, what logic is all about. For his logic contains metaphysical principles and thus transgresses, in so far, the limits of this science; moreover, it sets up a criterion of truth that cannot be a criterion, and thus gives rein to all kinds of fancies.

In present times there has been no famous logician, and we do not indeed need any new inventions for logic, because it contains merely the form of thinking.

und Bezeichnung des Wahren, und dessen Unterscheidung von Irrtum und Schein), 2 vols. (1764).

20. Johann Peter Reusch (1691–1754).

21. Cf. above, n. 10.

22. Christian August Crusius (1712–1775).

III. Concept of Philosophy in General / Philosophy According to the School Concept and According to the World Concept / Essential Requirements and Goals of Philosophizing / The Most General and Highest Tasks of This Science

It is sometimes difficult to explain what is understood by a science. A science gains in precision by establishing its definite concept; and quite a few mistakes are thus avoided, which for various reasons slip in when one is not yet able to distinguish the science from those related to it.

Before we try to give a definition of philosophy, we must first investigate the character of the different cognitions themselves; and since philosophic cognitions belong to the cognitions of reason, we must explain what is to be understood by the latter.

Cognitions of reason are opposed to *historical* cognitions. The former are cognitions out of *principles* (ex *principiis*), the latter out of *data* (ex *datis*). A cognition, however, may have arisen out of reason and notwithstanding be historical; when a mere copyist,²³ for example, learns the products of the reason of others, his cognition of such rational products is merely historical.

Cognitions may be distinguished

1) according to their *objective* origin, i.e. according to the sources from which alone a cognition is possible. In this respect all cognitions are either *rational* or *empirical*;

2) according to their *subjective* origin, i.e. according to the manner in which a cognition can be acquired by man. When seen from this latter viewpoint, cognitions are either *rational* or *historical*, whichever way they in themselves may

23. *Literator*.

have arisen. Something that *subjectively* is mere historical cognition, may therefore *objectively* be a cognition of reason.

It is harmful to know some rational cognitions merely historically; this does not matter with others. For example, the navigator knows the rules of navigation historically from his tables, and that is enough for him. But if a lawyer knows jurisprudence merely historically, he is completely ruined for being truly a judge, let alone a legislator.

From the aforementioned distinction between *objectively* and *subjectively* rational cognitions it becomes clear that, in a certain way, one can learn philosophy without being able to philosophize. He who truly wants to become a philosopher must practice the free use of his reason and not merely an imitative and, so to speak, mechanical use.

We have explained cognitions of reason as cognitions out of principles; and from this follows that they must be a *priori*. There are, however, two kinds of cognition which both are a *priori* and yet have many pronounced differences, namely, mathematics and philosophy.²⁴

One customarily maintains that mathematics and philosophy are distinguished from one another by their subject, in that the former deals with quantity, the latter with quality. This, however, is wrong. The difference between these sciences cannot rest on the subject, for philosophy is directed toward everything, therefore also toward quanta, and mathematics in part also [toward everything], as far as everything has a quantity. Only the different manner of rational cognition or of the use of reason in mathematics and philosophy is decisive for the specific difference between these two sciences. Philosophy, namely, is the cognition of reason out of mere concepts; mathematics, on the contrary, is the cognition of reason out of the construction of concepts.

We construct concepts when we exhibit them in intuition a

24. See B 740–747. Mathematics there serves as the prototype of an intuitive science, as against discursive philosophy.

25. Reading, with the list of printer's errors, *Allein* instead of the original *Alles*.

priori without experience or when we exhibit in intuition the object that corresponds to our concept.²⁶ The mathematician can never avail himself of his reason according to mere concepts, the philosopher can never avail himself of it through construction of concepts. In mathematics one uses reason in concreto, but the [corresponding] intuition is not empirical; rather one here constructs something for himself, a *priori*, as object of intuition.

And herein, as we see, mathematics has an advantage over philosophy, in that the cognitions of the former are *intuitive*, those of the latter, on the contrary, only *discursive*. The reason, however, why in mathematics we ponder more the quantities lies in this, that quantities can be constructed a *priori* in intuition, whereas qualities cannot be exhibited in intuition.²⁷

Philosophy, thus, is the system of philosophic cognitions or of cognitions of reason out of concepts. This is the scholastic [or school] concept of this science. According to its *world concept*²⁸ it is the science of the ultimate ends of human reason. This high concept gives philosophy its *dignity*, i.e. an absolute value. And actually it is philosophy alone that has an inner value and first gives value to all other cognitions.

In the end the question is always, What is philosophizing good for and what is its ultimate end? and this even when philosophy is considered as a science according to the scholastic concept.

In this scholastic meaning of the word, philosophy relates

26. These sentences are transliterated in B 741.

27. But see Anticipations of Perception, B 207–218.

28. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 867, Kant says: "World concept [Weltbegriff] is called here the concept that concerns what necessarily interests everyone." Probably influenced by the Latin equivalent given by Kant in B 866, *conceptus cosmicus*; all translators of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and Abbott have rendered *Weltbegriff* by "cosmical concept." Since these translators also call the *transcendental* (not practical) *Weltbegriffe*, or cosmological concepts, "cosmical concepts" (B 434), the confusion is complete. We have preferred "world concept" for *Weltbegriff*, analogous to "world language," "world state," etc., as it is less physically and more practically oriented than "cosmical concept." Cf. also just below, n.31, "cosmopolitan meaning."

only to *skill*; in reference to the world concept, on the contrary, it relates to *usefulness*. In the former respect it is a *doctrine of skill*; in the latter a *doctrine of wisdom*, the *lawgiver* of reason, and to that extent the philosopher is not a *theoretician of reason*,²⁹ but *lawgiver*.

The mere theoretician or, as Socrates calls him, the *philodoxus*, strives only after speculative knowledge, without caring how much his knowledge contributes to the ultimate end of human reason; he gives rules for the use of reason to all kinds of ends. The practical philosopher, the teacher of wisdom through doctrine and example, is the philosopher in the true sense.³⁰ For philosophy is the idea of a perfect wisdom that shows us the ultimate ends of human reason.

Two things belong to philosophy according to the scholastic concept:

First, a sufficient store of cognitions of reason; *second*, systematic coherence of these cognitions, or their conjunction in the idea of a whole.

Philosophy not only provides such strictly systematic coherence, but is the only science that has systematic coherence in the proper sense and gives systematic unity to all other sciences.

As concerns philosophy according to the world concept, however (*in sensu cosmico*), one may call it a *science of the highest maxim of the use of our reason*, if by maxim one understands the inner principle of choice among different ends.

For, in the latter meaning, philosophy is the science of relating all cognition and every use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, to which, as the supreme end, all others are subordinated and in which they must be joined into unity.

The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan³¹ meaning may be summed up in the following questions:

29. *Vernunftkünstler*, literally "artist of reason."

30. This, Kant thought, was a well-nigh extinct species: "Nobody cares about wisdom, because it makes science, which is a tool of vanity, rather small" (Akad. XVI, 1652).

31. *weltbürgerlich*, "of world citizens."

- 1) *What can I know?*—
- 2) *What ought I to do?*
- 3) *What may I hope?*
- 4) *What is man?*³²

The first question is answered by *metaphysics*, the second by *morality*, the third by *religion*, and the fourth by *anthropology*. At bottom all this could be reckoned to be anthropology, because the first three questions are related to the last.

The philosopher, therefore, must be able to determine

- 1) the sources of human knowledge,
- 2) the extent of the possible and advantageous use of all knowledge, and finally
- 3) the limits of reason.

The last is the most urgent but also the most difficult task, of which the *philodoxus*, however, takes no notice.

Two things, primarily, make the philosopher: (1) Cultivation of talents and skill to use them for various ends. (2) Readiness in the use of all means to any ends one may choose.³³ Both must be united, for without knowledge one never becomes a philosopher, but knowledge alone will never make the philosopher, unless there is added a purposeful joining of all cognitions and skills into unity, and an insight into their agreement with the highest ends of human reason.

No one at all can call himself a philosopher who cannot philosophize. Philosophizing, however, can be learned only through practice and the use of one's own reason.

How, indeed, should it be possible to learn philosophy? Every philosophical thinker builds his own work, so to speak, on the ruins of another; never, however, has a work come about that would have lasted in all its parts. Merely for that reason one cannot learn philosophy, because *it is not yet given*. Supposing, however, there actually were a philosophy: then no one who

32. The typography of the four questions—italics for (1) and (2) and the dash between them—follows the original. Note that the anthropological question (4) is not included in B 833.

33. *zu beliebigen Zwecken*, within the permissible, of course (cf. next sentence).

learned it could yet say of himself that he is a philosopher, for his knowledge of it would still be only *subjective-historical*.

In mathematics things are different. This science can in a certain way be learned, for here the proofs are so evident that everyone can become convinced of them; and because of its evidence it also can, as it were, be preserved as a *certain and permanent doctrine*.

He who wants to learn to philosophize must, on the contrary, regard all systems of philosophy only as the *history of the use of reason* and as objects for exercising his philosophical talent.

The true philosopher, as self-thinker, thus must make free, not slavishly imitating use of his reason. But not a *dialectical* use, i.e. one that aims only at giving cognitions a *semblance of truth and wisdom*. This is the business of the mere sophist, totally incompatible though with the dignity of the philosopher as one who knows and teaches wisdom.

For science has a true inner value only as an *organ of wisdom*. As such, however, it is indispensable, so that one may well maintain that wisdom without science is the shadowy outline of a perfection that we shall never reach.

He who hates science and so much the more loves wisdom is called a *misologist*. Misology usually springs from an emptiness of scientific attainments and a certain kind of vanity coupled with it. Sometimes, however, those also fall into the mistake of misology who at first pursued the sciences with much diligence and fortunate results but in the end found no satisfaction in all their knowledge.

Philosophy is the only science that can provide this inner satisfaction, for it closes, as it were, the scientific circle, and only through it do the sciences receive order and coherence.

For the sake of practice in self-thinking or philosophizing, we shall, therefore, have to look more to the *method* of our use of reason than to the propositions themselves that we have attained through it.

IV. Short Outline of a History of Philosophy

There is some difficulty in determining the borderline at which the *common* use of the understanding ends and the *speculative* begins, or where the common cognition of reason becomes philosophy.

There is, however, a fairly certain criterion here, namely the following:

Cognition of the general *in abstracto* is speculative cognition; cognition of the general *in concreto* is common cognition. Philosophy is speculative cognition and it therefore begins where the common use of reason sets out to make attempts at cognition of the general *in abstracto*.

Based on this determination of the difference between the common and the speculative use of reason, we can judge with which people the beginning of philosophizing must be dated. Among all peoples the Greeks first began to philosophize. For they first attempted to cultivate the cognition of reason *in abstracto* without the guiding thread of pictures, while other peoples sought instead to make concepts intelligible to themselves *in concreto by pictures* only. Even nowadays there are peoples like the Chinese and some Indians who indeed treat of things taken from mere reason, such as God, the immortality of the soul, and the like, but nevertheless do not seek to investigate the nature of these objects *in abstracto* according to concepts and rules. They make no separation between the use of reason *in concreto* and that *in abstracto*. Among the Persians and the Arabs one finds some speculative use of reason, but they borrowed its rules from Aristotle, thus from the Greeks. In the *Zend Avesta* of Zoroaster one does not detect the slightest trace of philosophy. This holds good also of the eulogized Egyptian wisdom, which in comparison with Greek philosophy was mere child's play.

As in philosophy, so in respect of mathematics, the Greeks have been the first to cultivate this part of reason's cognition