

A.C. ...
 Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
 (A 111)

element which cause and logical ground have in common, but his frequent application of the term *necessary* to causation in cases where it can hardly mean merely that the abstract principle that every change has a cause must necessarily apply to all phenomena¹ seems quite incompatible with a mere regularity view.
 Finally, the categories and schemata are not themselves principles (i.e. expressible in a universal proposition) but concepts, yet Kant's whole object is to prove certain principles concerning the universal application of these concepts, so I have completed the table by adding the principles which he actually claims to prove.

Forms of Judgments ² (Called Logical Functions).	Pure Concepts of Understanding. ³	Schemata. ⁴	Principles Proved.
Quantity:	Unity, Plurality, Singularity.	Number.	All intuitions are extensive magnitudes. ⁵
Quality:	Affirmative, Negative, Infinite.	Reality, Negation, Limitation.	In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has a degree. ⁶
Relation:	Categorical.	Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens).	Permanence.
			In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished. ⁷

¹ B 124, 234, 238, 240, 244, 247.
⁴ B 182-4.

² B 95.
⁶ B 207.

³ B 106.
⁷ B 224.

INDIVIDUAL CATEGORIES AND THEIR PROOFS 135

Forms of Judgment (Called Logical Functions).	Pure Concepts of Understanding. ³	Schemata.	Principles Proved.
Hypothetical.	Causality and Dependence (cause and effect).	Succession according to Rule.	All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect. ¹
Disjunctive.	Community (reciprocity between agent and patient).	Coexistence, according to a universal rule, of the determinations of different substances.	All substances, in so far as they can be perceived to co-exist in space, are in thorough-going reciprocity. ²
Modalities:			
Problematic.	Possibility—Impossibility.	Agreement with the conditions of time in general.	
Assertoric.	Existence—Non-Existence.	Existence in some determinate time.	
Apodeictic.	Necessity—Contingency.	Existence at all times.	

Relation between the Transcendental Deduction and the Metaphysical³ Deduction. The account of this is given, though all too briefly, in § 20 of the second edition of Transcendental Deduction. In the transcendental deduction itself Kant tries to show only that some categories or other are necessary, not what these necessary categories are,

¹ B 232.

² B 256.
³ For use of term *metaphysical* v. above, p. 25.

but he supplements his account later, in the *Analytic of Principles*, by special proofs of the individual categories.

He was not, however, content with this and sought not only to prove the categories separately but to obtain an *a priori* guarantee of the completeness and correctness of his list of categories. For this he has recourse to the *Metaphysical Deduction*. Here he claims to deduce the categories from the concepts generally used in formal logic in classifying judgments. He then argues like this:—

All phenomena presuppose a synthesis by the understanding (proved in the *Transcendental Deduction*).

A synthesis by the understanding = the bringing of data under the objective unity of apperception.

But a judgment must also be defined as the bringing of data under the objective unity of apperception.¹

∴ The synthesis must be governed by the same principles as those governing judgments.

The forms of judgments have been finally and completely classified by Aristotle.²

My categories are deduced from these forms in the *Metaphysical Deduction*.

∴ My categories are all valid of phenomena, and are the only categories.

We may note the summary of the argument given by Schulze, whom Kant himself recommends as his best expositor. "Thinking and judging are the same, for concepts are always predicates of possible judgments, and consequently there must be just as many pure concepts of understanding as there are different kinds of judgments."³

¹ B 141-2.

² This is an assumption not stated here, cf. Pref. B VIII.

³ *Erläuterungen über des Herrn Professor Kants Critik der reinen Vernunft*, pp. 29-30.

Kant is using *judgment* here to stand for any proposition or its mental assertion, and not, as elsewhere, for a special faculty. We must also remember that he is using *category* in a different sense from Aristotle, and that his categories are therefore not deduced from the concepts which Aristotle calls categories, but from the concepts used by Aristotle in the classification of judgments, which are different.

It may be asked why, if the above argument was valid, Kant applied to phenomena only concepts *derived* from formal logic and not exactly the same concepts as those used in formal logic, i.e. how the second column in the table I have given can be different from the first. The answer would presumably be that, while the acts of judging and of synthesis are essentially the same in kind, the conditions under which they are exercised are very different and the categories have accordingly to be modified to meet the different conditions. A judgment¹ has to give the truth about phenomena already synthesised and does not itself do the synthesising, and it is quite possible that the concepts required for the one function would have to undergo some slight modification when employed for the other.

[Kant's argument assumes (Ca) that the Aristotelian logic has given an exhaustive classification of the forms of judgment which can never require substantial amendment; (Cb) that the deduction of the categories from them follows with logical necessity in each case and is not in any way arbitrary; (Cc) that the synthetic thinking which makes phenomena essentially the same as the thinking of formal logic. Most philosophers nowadays would dispute all these assumptions, and would say that the metaphysical deduc-

¹ In the sense in which *judgment* is employed here. The faculty of judgment has a share in carrying out the synthesis.