HUMAN NATURE, PSYCHIC ENERGY, AND SELF-ACTUALIZATION IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*[1]

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In an important but infrequently[2] discussed passage at *Republic* 485d-e Socrates says:[3]

> But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to one thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel....So, when a man's desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument, if the man is a true and not a sham philosopher.

Discussions of Plato's psychology usually concentrate on the important analysis of the tripartite *psyche* in *Rep.* IV. I, however, will explicate Plato's metaphor of a psychic stream that can be diverted into different channels. In the first section I will argue that the "stream of desire" is identical with the *psyche*. Hence this metaphor will help us to understand how Plato integrates the parts of the *psyche*. In the second section I will state a model for reason ruling spirit and appetite, and I will argue that the "static" tripartite analysis of *Rep.* IV does not make plausible the claim that reason's rule produces happiness. In the last section I will show how this "dynamic" metaphor explains Plato's human nature claims, and I will argue that this metaphor makes plausible the claim that reason's rule produces happiness. I will also show that Platonic happiness is a self-actualization where someone is happy if and only if his psychic energy (*eros*) achieves an unimpeded, but not excessive, release through its proper channel. Furthermore, I will argue that every class in the ideal state achieves such self-actualization. Finally, I will analyze education and production in the *Republic* to show why Plato believes that a citizen can be happy doing one and only one task throughout his life.

I

Plato attributes to the *psyche* an intermediate status between the sensible world and the Forms. This status results from the different functions that it performs:[4] on the one hand the *psyche (Nous)* is the power by which we cognize the Forms, and hence it is akin to them

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because only like can know like (*Phaedo* 79dff., *Rep.* 490b, 611e); on the other hand the *psyche* is the ἀρχή (source, origin, or principle) of every motion (*Phaedrus* 245f., *Laws* 896a).[5] *Nous* is the principle of rational motion, and in a person a part of the *psyche* is the source of appetitive desire. I am only concerned with the *psyche* as a source of motion, and I will argue that Plato conceives of it as an active erotic agent. This agent is the "stream of desire" in our metaphor.

In *Republic* I one function (ἔργον) of the *psyche* is to live (353d), and in the *Phaedo*, Socrates states that the *psyche* invariably brings with it life (105c-d). There is a close connection between the *psyche* as a source of motion and its life-bearing function; only because something moves, in any number of ways (locomotion, the tropisms of plants, etc.), is it alive; and many Greeks, including Plato, thought that the whole *cosmos* is animated, and hence that there must be a world *psyche* diffused throughout it (*Timaeus* 34b).

When Plato restricts the *psyche* to *nous* alone, he juxtaposes it—in its simplicity, immutability, and indivisibility—with its entombing body. Here we find the two substance view of *Rep.* X and the *Phaedo*. But when he assumes that the *psyche* animates the body, he does not think in terms of the dichotomies material-immaterial, mind-matter, consciousness-matter. The relevant distinction is between an animate entity and a dead one, as in Aristotle's *De Anima* where the *psyche* is the actuality of a body potentially capable of life (412a16). This account of the *psyche* dominates the *Symposium, Republic* IV, and our metaphor.

The *Symposium* identifies the *psyche* with *eros*, and "*eros*" is a generic name for desire. At *Symposium* 205d Diotima says:

> Well it is just the same with love. Generically, indeed, it is all that desire of good things and of being happy—Love most mighty and all-beguiling. Yet, whereas those who resort to him in various other ways—in money-making, an inclination to sports, or philosophy—are not described either as loving or as lovers, all those who pursue him seriously in one of his several forms obtain, as loving and as lovers, the name of the whole

Diotima's ladder of love (210a-212a) depicts the ascent of the *psyche*, and this ascent is not just a more inclusive grasp of beauty, but also the replacement of lower desires by higher ones (see esp. 210b-d).

In the *Republic* (437c, 611e) and *Phaedrus* (248a-c, 249d, 251af.) Plato frequently uses power and force terminology to describe the *psyche's* action. At *Republic* 439a-b he says:

> The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns (ὀρέγεται) for this and its impulse (ὁρμᾷ) is towards this.

Republic 490a-b claims a similar impulse for the pursuit of knowledge. Plato also attributes to the psychic powers (δυνάμεις) actions that we would only predicate of persons: in the *Charmides* (167c-169a) sight *sees* (ὁρᾷ...ὄψις) itself, hearing *hears* itself, and perhaps knowledge *knows* itself; in the *Symposium* (199e) Love *loves* (Ἔρως ἔρως) its objects; and

in the *Republic* (478a) knowledge *knows* real being, and opinion *opines* what is between being and not being.[6]

The *psyche* yearns, strives, sees, hears, knows and desires; furthermore, according to the possibly pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades* I (129e-130d), a man is his *psyche*, because the *psyche* is the real agent. As the erotic agent and source of desire the *psyche* is identical with the "stream of desire" in our metaphor, and hence we can see how Plato's conception of the *psyche* fits with this metaphor.

II

The tripartite analysis of *psyche* in *Rep.* IV makes possible ἀκρασία "weakness of will." In the *Republic* Plato believes that only reason (λογισμός) calculates and invariably aims at the good (438a, 439c-d); the spirited and appetitive desires are intentionally directed to objects (437d-e), and are individuated by those objects (439a, 477c-d), but they are without calculation (ἀλόγιστος, 439d, 441c), and hence aim blindly. It is, then, possible for spirit or appetite to overthrow reason (440a-b, 441b-c), just as the military or appetitive natures can refuse to obey the guardians.

At *Republic* 436e-437a Plato states the following principle, and uses it to show that the *psyche* has parts:

> No such remark then will disconcert us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation [in relation to the same object] to suffer, be, or do (ποιήσειεν) opposites (πἀναντία).

This "principle of non-contrary *doings*" differs from the law of non-contradiction in two respects: (1) it applies to substances, actions, and qualities, but not propositions, and (2) it is specified in terms of contraries and not contradictories. Plato uses this principle to show that the *psyche* has parts, and when applied to the *psyche* it implies that the same psychic part cannot *do* opposites at the same time and *in respect to the same object*. Plato then describes cases of psychic conflict which purport to show that the *psyche* has parts. If desire bids us drink (gives us an impulse to drink) *w*, (a glass of water), but reason calculates that one ought not to drink (gives us an aversion to drink) *w*, then reason and thirst belong to different parts of the *psyche* (437b-d, 439b-d).

Commentators have argued that Plato can validly conclude that there are different parts to the *psyche*.[7] The soundness of his argument however, depends upon the correctness of his psychology; Plato believes that every psychic activity, including reason, has essentially connected with it an erotic impulse. But someone might object that the "principle of non-contrary *doings*" can be used to show that the appetite has an indefinite number of parts. If I desire to purchase both *X* and *Y*, but do not have sufficient funds for both, then the satisfaction of one desire precludes satisfying the other. This argument can be indefinitel

reiterated to purportedly show that the appetite has an indefinite number of conflicting desires, and hence an indefinite number of parts. But there is a reply to this objection:[8] the appetite can have desires that cannot be simultaneously satisfied, but they are not about the same object, but different objects, and hence they do not arise from different parts. If I more desire to buy *X* than *Y*, this does not imply that I have an aversion to *Y*. The appetite is a bundle of desires, few of which can be simultaneously satisfied, and yet they all originate from a single source. Thus there are only as many parts to the *psyche* as are needed to explain simultaneous contrary impulses about the same object, and the channels in our metaphor represent these parts.

There are two models for reason ruling spirit and appetite; on the first, reason chooses the means for satisfying desire; and on the second, reason both moderates the intensity of desire and normatively decides which desires to satisfy. The first model is incorrect because, while Plato identifies reason's rule with virtue, this model is compatible with cowardice, intemperance, and vice. I may desire, for example, to cheat my employer, and reason would calculate the most efficacious means to achieve this end. The second model is, I believe, clearly correct.

Plato argues that reason's rule over spirit and appetite produces happiness.[9] But if reason controls the intensity of desire, and normatively decides which desires to satisfy, then is not Plato's happy (satisfied) man the possessor of numerous unsatisfied desires, and thus is not Plato's analysis of the just man a frustration model?[10] The philosopher "accepts" the reduction of his appetites to necessity (571b-c), the community of women and children, and even the regulation of his sexual behavior; the appetitive man neither satisfies his numerous appetites nor appears to display the simplest calculative ability, since he is locked into one and only one task. The tripartite analysis does not answer this objection because it depicts reason's control of spirit and appetite as external to them, just as the laws compel behavior from without.[11] Because the tripartite analysis pictures three unconnected sources of psychic energy, it neither explains why the philosopher does not have more appetites than he is allowed to satisfy, nor why the appetitive man does not desire to reason more than he is allowed. The tripartite analysis, moreover, does not explain how the appetitive man can justly release—rather than frustrate—his appetitive energy in order to be happy.

III

I will now explicate in detail the "dynamic" metaphor of a "psychic" stream that has different channels. This analysis will reveal Plato's human nature claims, and it will plausibly explain why he believes that reason's rule produces happiness. I will not, however, argue for the plausibility of his human nature claims, nor will I adjudicate between

competing accounts of human nature. Below are diagrams of metaphor, and for brevity and elegance of exposition I only show the philosophical and appetitive natures.[12]



Psychic energy (*eros*) flows through the stream and out one or more of the channels. Plato implies that the stream, itself, always has a constant flow;[13] otherwise, when the desires incline strongly in one direction, they would not be weakened in the others. Furthermore, energy cannot be stored to simultaneously strengthen desire in two or more directions.

Plato believes that everybody has three major channels (parts of the soul) for the outlet of psychic energy. The widths of the channels in the diagrams represent the maximum dispositions for the flow of *eros*. The philosophical nature has its greater potential discharge (ῥεῦμα 485d) through the reason channel, while the appetitive nature's greatest potential discharge is through appetite. Plato believes that one channel innately predominates in everybody. Given our greatest maximum disposition, we are made of gold, silver, or bronze (415a), or to use an alternative terminology, we are lovers of wisdom, honor, or wealth (474cff., 581c).

If left to our own devices, we would naturally desire and act through our maximum channel. The example of Gyges' ring (359d-360d) shows that Plato agrees with Glaucon about what an appetitive nature *would tend to do or desire if* social strictures or incentives were removed. What a man *would tend to do or desire if* left to his own devices I will call a "natural disposition." Plato pessimistically believes that most men are naturally disposed to appetite (431b-c, 442a), and if left to their own devices would tend towards excessive aggression and appetition.[14] A philosophical nature would be disposed to seek the truth, if it did not encounter the corrupting influences described in *Rep.* VI, although

without the proper education there is little probability that it would obtain it.

The metaphor's most important claim is that when more energy flows through one channel it is weakened in the others. This gives an internal dynamic connection to the parts of the soul that is missing in the tripartite analysis. I will now describe how reason rules spirit and appetite in terms of this dynamic metaphor.

When a philosopher's reason approaches the path of learning—as in the ladder of love in the *Symposium*—then erotic energy flows through the reason channel, *and the other channels are necessarily weakened*. This explains why (1) the philosopher has no desire to rule, and must be "compelled" to do so (421b-c, 500d, 517c-d);[15] (2) he voluntarily reduces his appetites to those minimally necessary for the maintenance of the body (571b-c); and (3) he accepts the community of women and children, as well as the regulation of his sexual behavior. The philosopher's dominant desire is for intellectual activity.

When reason is corrupted it serves the appetites.[16] In describing the corruption of a philosophical nature (*Rep.* VI), Plato depicts a master criminal who is very clever at satisfying desires, his own and especially those of others. Although the corrupt philosophical nature is capable of great evil (491e-492a), it does not revel in the satisfaction of appetite, more often it is a tool for the satisfaction of others' desires (494b-d). The master criminal is often more interested in how he pulls-off the caper than in the loot. The dynamic metaphor explains why this is so; a philosophical nature does not have a strong natural disposition to appetitive desires and enjoyments.[17]

Reason, in the appetitive man, controls the appetites when (1) it moderates them so that it achieves its own weak potential, and (2) it focuses the appetites upon their proper ends. (1) and (2) are both necessary because a moderate desire towards an improper end can result in an injustice, while an excessive desire for an appropriate end can be self-destructive. Reason must both moderate the discharge of appetitive energy, focus it, *and yet allow it satisfaction*. Thus Plato permits the appetitive class to possess money, private property, and wives. But to show that the appetitive man is happy, we must analyze how appetitive energy is focused and yet released in production, and to understand this we must first investigate education and production in the *Republic*.

Reason obtains rule in the ideal state by means of education. The basic education in music and gymnastics is the real totalitarian tool of the state. The *Republic* opens with an overt conflict between persuasion and coercion (327c), but Plato clearly chooses the former (Bks. II and III).[18] The guardians do not, except in extreme circumstances, compel or coerce citizens, rather, their control of the educational policy and machinery enables them to shape beliefs and behavior. Education is analogous to the cosmic process of reason (the demiurge) persuading necessity (the errant cause consisting of random, unintelligent powers)

to take on form, shape, and limit (*Timaeus* 48a). Likewise, the educator persuades unintelligent (439d, 441c) spirit and appetite to "accept" limit and focus. The basic education in music has a dual function: (1) the content of stories and songs should tend to produce moderate habits of spirit and appetite, as well as true beliefs, and (2) the manner of presentation (vocal tone, rhythm, etc.) should foster moderation.

There is evidence in the *Republic* to show that all the citizens receive a basic education. At *Rep.* 443e Plato states that a man should not "turn to practice if he finds anything to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendence of the body or it may be in political action or private business" until he has become just and temperate (also see 425c-e). Moreover, at 590d he says, "...it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same." If the appetitive class did not receive a basic education, then not only would the ideal state be unjust because of a lack of equal opportunity, but also it would be short lived, since immoderation would soon overthrow the guardians.

Except for extensive discussions of basic education, pre-philosophical, and philosophical training, Plato is silent about the rest of his educational program. We must, therefore, use some historical license to reconstruct a plausible intermediate educational scheme based upon evidence in other contexts. The first consideration is that each citizen is naturally suited for one and only one occupation (370a-b), and unless the citizens are placed in the correct occupations, the state cannot be just (433a). But how will the guardians diagnose occupational abilities? Some commentators think that the criterion is heredity, and consequently that the *Republic* is a caste state; but *Rep.* 415b-c disproves this (also see 423c-d):

> So that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing else are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these metals [gold, silver, and bronze] in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out among the artizans or the farmers. And, again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they shall honour such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of the guardian....

The only plausible and equitable manner in which the guardians could "intently observe" different natures is to allow *all* the children to enter a task oriented educational system intermediate between the basic one and dialectical training. Nothing in the *Republic* precludes this possibility.[19] Moreover, the guardians select their own successors by observing, testing, and training the children in a variety of tasks (412e, 413c-414b, 486b-c). The guardians observe which children show an eagerness and facility for learning, and select them to be trained as

guardians (455b-c). The philosopher king is an artist who glances both at the moral Forms *and at human nature*, so that "by erasing one touch or stroke and painting in another" the human can be made as much as possible like the divine (501b-c).

Let us imagine that the city state is analogous to an open classroom. Within it are a variety of tasks—fighting in heavy armor, counting, cobbling, masonry, etc.—and the children are allowed to try what they desire. They are not led to believe that the tasks differ either in prestige or in potential monetary value, nor is any particular task recommended to them. By hypothesis, this system allows the children to manifest their natural dispositions—what they would tend to do or desire if left to their own devices. Each psychic channel has a range of activities correlated with it: a philosophical nature tends towards calculation, mathematics, and an interest in *elenchus*; a spirited nature loves fighting in heavy armor and contact sports; the appetitive man is naturally drawn to the counting house, cobbling, or armament making (580d-581b). Plato believes that every child will be naturally disposed towards one and only one of these ranges. Children are allowed to pick-up and drop activities for a lengthy period of time—up to twenty years—until they show definite patterns of preference and become "fixed" on certain tasks. This information is then used by the guardians to place the citizens in occupations.

There are, however, several serious objections to this scheme. A citizen must both be skilled at his occupation to provide high quality products for the state (370b-c, 371a), and yet happy at his task. Every class in the ideal state, insofar as its nature allows, is to be happy (420b, 421c).[20] If a citizen's most pervasive activity is his occupation (370b-c), and one cannot be happy unless he enjoys his most pervasive activity, then satisfaction must be achieved in work. But there is no guarantee that one's desires and abilities will coincide. One could desire to be a pianist, but lack the ability; another has the ability to be a mathematician, but lacks the interest. In reply to the first case Plato argues (486b-c):

> This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophic and unphilosophic you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage....Nor will you overlook this, I fancy....Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully and with little result from much toil?

The psychological generalization that people do not like activities they are bad at is plausible within the context of one's vocational activities. Furthermore, Plato, no less than an ordinary Greek, is fascinated with the ἀγών (contest), and he frequently requires that the potential guardians compete.[21] If our aspiring pianist consistently performed poorly, then initially peer pressure, and ultimately his own dissatisfaction with his performance, would dissuade him from continuing. The civic teachers should then provide alternative activities to capture his

interest. Moreover, the "one and only one occupation for each citizen" principle does not preclude avocations.

In the case of a child with mathematical ability but no interest, the guardians are not interested in abilities unsupported by *eros*. A necessary condition for correct placement in an occupation is the desire for it. Nowhere in the *Republic* does Plato state that any citizen should be forced into an occupation he does not desire.[22]

In *Republic* II (374b-d) he says:

> Should our concern be greater, then, for the cobbler's art than for the art of war?...Can we suppose, then, that while we were at pains to prevent the cobbler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that we might have the cobbler's business well done, and similarly assign to each and every one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted and at which he was to work all his days, at leisure from other pursuits and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the business of war is not of supreme moment.

There are two objections to this passage: (1) Plato cuts human nature too finely when he thinks that there is a specific nature suited for cobbling, another for weaving, etc., and (2) he thinks that a person should spend his whole life in one and only one occupation which could be, to say the least, tedious.

The first objection must be conceded because to tune a complicated engine or repair an artery need not require different abilities or natures. Likewise, a man could be equally skilled and interested in carpentry and sculpture. This concession, however, does not *greatly* damage the social plan of the *Republic*. For at *Rep.* 434a-c Plato admits that:

> A carpenter undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter...or even the attempt of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it?...The interference with one another's business, then, of the three existent classes [reason, spirit, and appetite] and the substitution of the one for the other is the greatest injury to a state....

The interchange of functions within a class is not *terribly* damaging to the state, although one between classes is (see 421a-b). Thus Plato is only firmly committed to a sharp distinction between the major categories of reason, spirit, and appetite.

We have already partially answered the second objection by showing that certain exchanges of occupation are permissible. But why would Plato believe that someone would want to spend his whole life at one and only one task? The answer to this question lies in Plato's theory of productive labor.

An important implication of the Socratic analogy between virtue and the other practical or productive arts is the clear recognition of rational procedures in the latter. In the *Gorgias* Socrates distinguishes arts from mere empirical knacks in that the former use a rational method and aim at the good of their subject matter, while the latter do not; philosophy, gymnastics, and medicine are examples of arts; sophistry, cosmetics,

and cookery are knacks (462cff.). The *Cratylus* has an extensive discussion of how a shuttlemaker must discover and look at the proper form (εἶδος) of shuttle to place in a carefully selected matter (389aff.). The εἶδος in this passage is not the separate Form of the *Republic*, and hence Plato does not attribute knowledge (in the *Republic*'s sense) to the shuttlemaker;[23] nevertheless, the *Cratylus* emphasizes the skill involved in production.

Plato's many examples and analogies depict a craft production society (*Gorgias* 462cff., 503dff., *Rep.* 487e-489a), and an important feature of such production is that an artisan produces a complete product. I do not mean that a single man produces the whole parthenon, but rather that complete units of such a structure are the responsibility of different craftsmen; for example, one craftsman is responsible for the frieze-work on the north portico. The more common unit of production, however, is a shoe, shuttle, statue, etc., and a single craftsman makes the complete work. Craftsmen are very interested in the perfection of their products, and constantly try both to develop a better εἶδος (plan or structure) and to test the matter that receives it. This can be a never ending process. A result of craft production is that the maker identifies with his product, is proud of it, and considers it an extension of his own talents.[24]

We can now understand why Plato believes that a lifetime can be satisfactorily spent at a single task. Furthermore, almost twenty years is spent in intermediate education, and this allows ample experimentation before placement in the production system. If an artisan later desires to change his occupation, the guardians must see whether or not his nature is suited to the new interest. If it is, then the change is permissible; if not, then persuasions like those found in the educational system can be employed.

I have argued that Plato could use an intermediate education to diagnose occupational abilities. When students become "fixed" on certain tasks, the guardians send them out into the state to perform them. This scheme, however, depends upon the assumption (that Plato never states and hence was probably unaware of) that the natural dispositions and abilities are distributed to meet the state's production requirements. Without this assumption, the guardians would need to compel some citizens to do tasks that they are not suited for. While this assumption is highly debateable, it is testable within the framework of an education that allows for the manifestation of natural dispositions.

In conclusion, let us return to how reason's rule produces happiness. Each channel for the release of *eros* has its own desires and pleasures (580d). Moreover, each type of nature judges that its pleasures are best (581c-e); although Plato believes that the pleasures of intellect are most real and pure (585d-586a).

The philosopher's exercise of reason is pleasant, and he believes that it is. Moreover, he achieves the satisfaction suited to his natural

disposition, and has no desire for other satisfactions because his reason channel has siphoned off most of his erotic energy. The philosopher is not repressed, but rather his reason is fostered and strengthened along philosophical paths. Therefore, in the ideal state the philosopher is self-actualized; not only does he have the private exercise of his reason, but also he achieves its natural expression, to rule in the city (496e-497a, 498e, 592a-b). Hence the philosopher is a happy, satisfied man.

The appetitive nature must be moderated so that it does not result in excessive, burdensome, or self-destructive behavior. The appetitive man's *psyche* must not be like the leaky jar of the *Gorgias* (493a-494a), nor must he engage in overreaching behavior (*Rep.* I 349bff.). Appetitive energy is channeled into production, and thus moderated; the guardians form what could be foolish boldness into military courage, and potential intemperance becomes pride in one's product. Hence the appetitive *eros* releases its energy in production and the possession of money, property, and wives. The appetitive nature receives the pleasures suited to it, and believes that they are the best pleasures. Because the appetites are released, without excess, the appetitive man is self-actualized; hence he is satisfied and happy.

The city as a whole is a reasonably stable[25] factionless unity, and hence happy. Each class provides to the whole necessities, while receiving the rewards appropriate to its nature (see *Rep.* 460b, 463a-b): the appetitive class provides sustenance and possesses private property, the military protects the state and acquires honor, and the philosophers rule the city, protect its institutions, and are granted leisure. Each class believes that it receives the best rewards (581c-d), and hence faction is banished from the only true city. This accords with Plato's emphasis throughout the *Republic* on unity in the ideal city, and parallels his equally important emphasis on unity and friendship among the parts of the soul.[26]

NOTES

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[2] An important exception to this is F.M. Cornford, "The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's *Symposium*," printed in *The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays* by F.M. Cornford, ed. by W.K.C. Guthrie (Cambridge University Press, 1950), and reprinted in *Plato* II, ed. by G. Vlastos (New York, 1971); see p. 123 in the reprint.

[3] The translations and Greek are from the Loeb editions of Plato, especially the Shorey